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BOOK REVIEWS
ATOMIC ENERGY AND CONGRESS. BY MORGAN THOMAS, IN
COLLABORATION WITH ROBERT M. NORTHROP. Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press, 1956. Pp. vi, 301. $4.75.
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING IN ATOMIC ENERGY. BY-
RICHARD A. TYBOUT. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan
Press, 1956. Pp. x, 226. $4.50.
The growth of the Atomic Energy Commission within the frame-
work of our constitutional government is most assuredly unparalleled
in the history of our efforts to regulate and control a segment of
American endeavor. After the first acquaintance with the terrible
destructive powers of atomic energy, the lawmakers in 1946 estab-
lished, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic
Energy.
The foresight of this legislation must be appreciated if the then
existing secrecy and the only partial understanding are considered;
added thereto are the distinct factors of progress in the competitive
atomic cold war race and the protection of human life from poten-
tially dangerous new scientific development.
To explain the policies and the success of their enactment, these
two books have been written. The first, Atomic Energy and Con-
gress, obviously deals not so much with committees or commissions,
but with people. The author, who made this study under the famed
Michigan Memorial-Phoenix Project, has shown with some success
that the relations developed by these two important governmental
bodies charged with the policy making-The Joint Congressional
Committee on Atomic Energy and The Atomic Energy Commis-
sion-are not so much dictated by necessity, or knowledge, or rank,
or law, but by human relations; depending upon the cooperation,
or the lack of it, received by either group, the program expanded or
suffered.
The stresses and strains of the growth period of 1946-1955 cov-
ered in this book mirror the many personalities who contributed to
the awe inspiring atomic industrial and military build-up, with their
varying talents-such men as Chairmen Lilienthal, Smyth, Dean
and Strauss, and Committee Chairmen McMahon, Hickenlooper,
Cole and Anderson.
In addition to the relationships of governmental authorities, the
means used to operate the vast installations owned by the Commis-
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sion-or rather, the public-are analyzed in the second book Gov-
ernment Contracting in Atomic Energy, written also by a member
of the faculty of the University of Michigan. The author evaluates
the varying types of contracts utilized by different governmental
agencies in the exercise of their functions through private business
organizations, and discusses in detail the emphasis placed in the field
of atomic energy on cost-reimbursement contracts since there are
involved many novel and little recognized characteristics. The author
reasons that cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts are consistent with gov-
ernment ownership, cost minimization and government risk assump-
tion.
Since the 1946 Act established a virtual monopoly over atomic
energy in this country and with the realization that government
spending by the Commission grew from 565 million in 1947 to a
total of 12 billion up to and including 1955, the formative years
of atomic energy as discussed in both books will remain of greatest
interest to those who come in contact with the varied applications of
the atom.
The 1954 Act which was designed to transform the wholly
monopolistic industry to one popularly called "business-government
partnership" does not remove the need to know the early experi-
ences and trial and tribulations as discussed in these books. How-
ever, it should be recognized that had it been possible to let atomic
knowledge and application grow by natural means, rather than under
pressure of our hot and cold war commitments, the need for such
elaborate governmental, developmental and control machinery
might not have been necessary for many years.
Frank Norton'
THE CALVO CLAUSE: A PROBLEM OF INTER-AMERICAN
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY. BY DON-
ALD R. SHEA. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955.
Pp. 323. $5.50.
It is highly recommended that both the experienced foreign busi-
ness enterpriser and he who may be placing a tentative toe into the
unknown waters of private investment in Latin America read The
Calvo Clause by Donald R. Shea, a lucid and challenging volume of
nine chapters in which the author has conducted an inquiry into the
* Attorney, Dallas, Texas; Chairman, Texas Committee on Atomic Energy.
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status of the Calvo Clause as it is related to the diplomatic protection
of commercial interests in Latin America.
The author points out that the Calvo Clause has existed as a legal
and diplomatic problem for about eighty years. Because the unsettled
social and economic conditions in Latin American nations at times
placed the lives and property of aliens in jeopardy during the latter
part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth,
diplomatic interposition on behalf of citizens abroad, ranging from
notes of protest to armed intervention, was often directed at cer-
tain Latin American nations.
Statesmen and jurists of Latin America registered protests against
interventions claiming that a dual standard of international treat-
ment was followed by world powers whereby the nations of Latin
America were regarded as inferior and therefore proper subjects of
diplomatic interposition, which placed them in an unequal position
in relation to other nations. In reply, the intervening States declared
that principles of general international law established a minimum
standard for the treatment of aliens. That is, in general a State is
under no responsibility to grant greater protection to foreigners than
to its own citizens, with the exception that if a State's standard of
justice with respect to its own nationals is so low that it fails to
measure up to a general norm governing the members of the family
of nations, the alien is granted the right to appeal to the average
norm rather than to accept the lower norm ruling within the
State. To secure this minimum standard established by international
law, a nation has a right to protect the lives and property of its
citizens abroad through such measures of interposition as it deems
necessary, including armed intervention.
In an effort to eliminate such interventions, the Latin American
nations attempted, by considerable ingenuity, to devise schemes to
avoid liability for injuries to aliens, foremost among which was the
use of the Calvo Clause in contracts concluded with aliens. The
Calvo Clause is a stipulation utilized in contracts entered into be-
tween the State and foreign investors whereby the alien agrees that
disputes which may arise out of the contract are to be submitted to
local courts and are to give rise to no international claims. By such
a clause it is contended that the alien has waived all his right of
diplomatic protection from the State of his nationality.
As Mr. Shea points out, an internal constitutional or statutory
provision cannot modify the right of another State to grant pro-
tection to one of its citizens abroad, but the Calvo Clause is another
1957]
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matter, for here the question arises as to whether the voluntary sur-
render of right of protection by the interested citizen can affect or
modify the right of diplomatic interposition which international law
grants to all nations.
Mr. Shea's book is a thorough piece of research into past and
present approaches to this question. He writes easily, briefly and
forthrightly, and substantiates his conclusion that at present the
Calvo Clause may actually serve to bar a claim, and that at present
the Calvo Clause may play an important role in the life of a private
investor abroad. In the concluding chapter, the author faces the
problem of the future of the Clause, and points out that its present
status is somewhere between the two extreme views of complete
validity of the Clause and complete invalidity thereof, and he pre-
dicts that eventually the Calvo Clause will be incorporated as an
essential part of inter-American public law.
A word of praise must be bestowed upon the University of Min-
nesota Press for its service in publishing such an important study
for all who labor in the field of inter-American affairs, whether
such work be of a financial, diplomatic or scholastic nature.
Ann Van Wynen Thomas*
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES. BY CHARLES L. B.
LOWNDES AND ROBERT KRAMER. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1956. Pp. xxii, 1028. $25.00.
The advent of a comprehensive treatise on a major subject is
always welcome. This is particularly true when the subject has al-
tered considerably since the last previous general commentary. If
the new book contains exhaustive analyses as well as useful syntheses,
there is real cause for rejoicing. Professors Lowndes and Kramer, of
Duke Law School, have given us all of these in their text on federal
estate and gift taxes.
The book is tripartite: I, estate tax (620 pages) ; II, gift tax (205
pages) ; III, tax planning for estates (146 pages). The first two parts
contain most of the analysis, the third has the synthesis.
Part I begins with a short background discourse on death taxes:
their character, types and use, and arguments pro and con. The
litigative history of the federal estate tax is then briefly considered.
Most of the rest of Part I is in the traditional, functional pattern
*Co-author of NON-INTERVENTION-THE LAW OF THE AMERICAS (1956) with
A. J. Thomas, Jr.; member, State Bar of Texas.
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used in treatises and casebooks: detailed examination of gross estate,
exemption, deduction, valuation, computation, credit and procedure.
One interpolation is the droll story, devotedly told, of lighthouse
cases like Northern Trust,1 May,' Klein,' St. Louis Union Trust,"
Hallock,' Church,' and Spiegel.' These demonstrate, among other
things, that Treasury and Taxpayer wage war as relentlessly and
deviously over the estate tax (which is not basically a revenue
measure) as over the income tax (which is). The authors recount
the tale of early Supreme Court hostility to transfers "intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after" death.' The Court
ignored "intended" and read "possession or enjoyment" as though
it were "title." Congressional responses to the Court's decisions form
one of the best narratives in our political-judicial history. Highly
fascinating is the reversal of positions in the late 1940's when the
legislators chose to curtail the judges' broadening concept of tax-
ability. Although much of this learning is obsolete, the authors sagely
note its significance for those who would understand the evolution
of the law or divine its future course.
Part II deals with gift taxes. The background chapters are followed
by consideration of types of transfer, exclusion, deduction, exemp-
tion, splitting and procedure. Although Part II is a complete treat-
ment of gift tax, and Part I of estate tax, each has some parallel
material on the other's subject.
The content of the book is far more incisive than these remarks
suggest. Everywhere there is evident the product of deep thought,
careful scrutiny and scholarly collation of statutes, rulings and de-
cisions. The blending of history and dialectic, so essential to an un-
derstanding of the two taxes, is skillfully accomplished.
Deep analysis is to be found in a series of comparative or cross-
sectional passages. For example, two chapters (1:13 and 11:9) deal
with "consideration" in all situations where a transfer may provoke
' Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929). These cases are discussed at
pp. 84-105 of the book.
'May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
3Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231 (1931).
'Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39 (1935).
sHelvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940).6 Comm'r v. Church's Estate, 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
'Spiegel's Estate v. Comm'r, 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §811 (c) (1) (C), 53 STAT. 120, derived from Revenue Act
of 1916, §202(b), 39 STAT. 778. This provision, supplanted by its own ramified progeny,
was deleted in 1954.
' Author Lowndes once chided casebook editors for abstracting these cases instead of
letting students taste their "subtle flavor" from the full opinions. Lowndes, Book Review,
3 J. LEGAL ED. 658 (1951). Lowndes and Kramer manage to transmit a great deal of the
flavor in their own distillation.
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a tax because it is made for less than "adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth."" Chapter 1:20 embraces all aspects of
valuation. In the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the gross estate
is defined by a general section 2033 (property in which the decedent
had an "interest") and the specific sections which follow it (property
transferred by the decedent subject to life estate, reversion, power
to revoke, etc.). The overlap and interrelation of these sections are
lucidly outlined on pages 42-52. The relation between sections
2036(a) (2) (retained power to designate income or possession) and
2038 (retained power to alter, amend or revoke) receives equally
careful delineation on pages 170-73.
Varied insights are offered into the wonderful complexity of an-
nuity problems (commercial as well as private), the ill-defined nature
of "incidents of ownership" in a life insurance policy (particularly
the possibility of inheritance by the insured from his policy assignee),
and the differences in the definition of charity for estate, gift and
income tax deductions.
Although the volume is eminently dispassionate, the authors do
not hesitate to flog a few dead horses (Bull," May," St. Louis Union
Trust 3) and an occasional live one (Harris,'14 Kohl").
Parts I and II, the estate and gift tax exegesis, will be widely used
by students and teachers. (Some adventurous instructor may even
essay this end of the tax course with Kramer, Lowndes and Code,
but no casebook.) The lawyer litigating an estate or gift tax will
find here an armory of arguments. The tax specialist will regard
the whole book as a part of his general culture. But what has this
versatile volume for the attorney without a Treasury Card? Confi-
dent of his wills, trusts and experience, he is unlikely to read Parts
I and II. Part III is mainly for him, and it is to be hoped that he
will read it with apprehension.
Part III is entitled "Tax Planning for Estates." This phrase is
carefully distinguished from "estate planning." Tax planning is
"arranging one's affairs so as to reach a desired end at the minimum
0INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§2035-2038, 2043, 2512, 2516.
"Bull v. U.S., 295 U.S. 247 (1935) (limited right to share in partnership profits after
death not includible in gross estate).
12 See note 2 supra (reserved life estate not includible in gross estate).
" See note 4 supra (possibility of reverter extinguished at death not includible in gross
estate).
" Harris v. Comm'r, 340 U.S. 106 (1950) (no gift by transfer pursuant to agreement
later incorporated in divorce decree, even though in settlement of marital rights).
"Kohl v. United States, 226 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1955) (life insurance premium pay-
ment test unconstitutional).
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tax cost."' 8 Tax planning is only a phase of the highly individual
process of estate planning; the latter includes all aspects of acquir-
ing, conserving and distributing property. The authors deliberately
eschew sample plans and form clauses. They warn that tax con-
siderations are always to be reviewed but must never dominate.
Equally vital are precise draftsmanship, anticipation of all possible
contingencies, and due regard for state law. The client's dispositive
desires are paramount.
What have Messrs. Lowndes and Kramer to add to the torrent of
estate plan wisdom that has lately streamed forth from life under-
writers, trust officers, accountants and attorneys? For one thing, the
authors have a keen eye for mathematical demonstration and a
righteous ethic for tax avoidance. But mainly they bring mature
reflection and impartial scholarship.
The authors have an admirable talent for saying complicated
things in simple ways. They are perhaps at their best in the planning
chapters. They point out effortlessly that estate taxes are saved pri-
marily by inter vivos transfers to keep property out of the trans-
feror's estate and by creation of successive estates to keep property
out of the transferee's estate. They relate this to the marital deduc-
tion, showing how it usually is alternative to successive estates. They
then illustrate the possibilities by numerical examples of various dis-
positions of various estates. Among their conclusions is this: "Maxi-
mum estate-gift tax savings are usually achieved by giving away a
substantially larger part of the taxpayer's estate during his life than
will produce maximum income tax savings." 1
Integration of income tax planning with estate tax planning is a
lengthier task than the authors try to complete. They do, however,
include a primer of income tax characteristics: progressive rates,
annual periods, preferential treatment of capital gain, tax recogni-
tion of artificial legal entities, net income base for tax, and types
of exclusions. From these they derive cardinal principles of income
tax avoidance: distribute income to low brackets, take capital gains
rather than ordinary income where possible, avoid realization of in-
come, and exploit deductions.
The chapters on planning naturally repeat much of the material
of the expository chapters in Parts I and II, but the emphasis is on
construction rather than dissection. The redundancy may be tire-
8 p. 830. The distinction between tax and estate planning is found in a widely read
article, Lowndes, Introduction to Tax Planning for Estates, 27 N.C.L. REv. 2 (1948).
The article forms the foundation for Chapters 1-3 of Part III of the book.
" P. 842.
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some for the cover-to-cover reader, but it is clearly desirable for the
rushed researcher who wants all his reading in one place.
Because of their meticulous survey, the authors will command
great attention to their remarks on tax planning devices. They favor
the limited power of appointment as a flexible means of devolution
without successive taxes, especially since a beneficiary may take
corpus according to a standard as well as under a fixed formula.
They display less enthusiasm for the marital deduction than do some
other writers; after a careful consideration of the mathematics in-
volved, the authors conclude that the deduction is often used more
from habit than from understanding.
Life insurance receives a good recommendation. It provides de-
sirable liquidity at death and is essentially testamentary. By low-gift-
tax transfers inter vivos it can be removed from the estate yet kept
in force and increased in value. Any reinstatement of the premium
payment test is not likely to be retroactive; wise counsellors, the
authors conclude, will take quick advantage of its absence."
Words of caution on two other matters deserve particular heed
from practitioners. Buy-and-sell agreements do not always fix pro-
perty values for tax purposes. Section 2503 (c) (permitting "present
interest" trusts for minors) has too many uncertainties to permit
exploration for its exact limits.
Each reviewer is privileged to tell his authors what they should
have done differently. Here is my list of topics which I think were
presented insufficiently if at all. More should have been said about the
tactics and techniques of choosing between estate and income tax
deduction for administrative expenses.19 This extensive a book should
give some warning about the local fiduciary consequences of estate
tax actions, e.g. use of the optional valuation date." Widespread
interest in executives' deferred compensation contracts warrants
analysis of their estate tax consequences, particularly in terms of the
contingencies that they contain. 1 How efficacious is the widely used
Is P. 838. This interesting observation, like many others, is not accessible to the reader
who approaches via the index.
"2Some mention will be found on p. 337. There are questions about the types of
expenses for which a choice is available; see, for example, Rev. Rul. 56-449, 1956
INT. REV. BULL. No. 37, at 13, as corrected by Special Announcement, 1957 INT. REv.
BULL., No. 8, at 8, reflecting the Internal Revenue Service's own confusion about the
matter. There is a dilemma under Income Tax Regs., §1.642(g)-1 which construes the
statement required for income tax deduction as a relinquishment of the right to estate
tax deduction, apparently even if the income tax deduction is subsequently disallowed.
20 For some of the questions raised, see BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION 968, n. 6 (1955).
"Cf. Goodman v. Granger, 56-1 U.S.T.C. Para. 11,595 (CCH); 1956 P-H Para. 140,253
(W.D. Pa. 1956), rev'd, 4-A P-H 1957 FED. TAX SERV. Para. 140,396 (3d Cir. Apr. 12,
1957).
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draftsman's device of including general powers to release powers?
There is an income tax deduction for estate tax paid on items of
income in respect of a decedent. It would be desirable for the authors
to examine this as critically as they have the estate tax credits for
prior gift taxes, prior estate taxes and foreign death taxes. Like all
educators and most practitioners in the field, the authors must feel
the need for coordination of the income, estate and gift tax statutes."a
They have not campaigned directly for this in their book, but
perhaps they may be forgiven in view of the vast energy and in-
telligence already lavished on this worthy project without much
success.
One last encomium is due Professors Lowndes and Kramer. By
writing gracefully as well as soundly in most places, they show that
clumsiness is merely characteristic, not essential, for legal prose.
Finally, a few objections need to be registered. (1) The price of
the volume puts it beyond the reach of many general practitioners
and virtually all students. (2) The sleeve on the back cover hints
broadly that pocket parts will be forthcoming. The sleeve is too
delicate and the binding too tight to accommodate even a commentary
on the Proposed Regulations, much less periodic reviews of other
aspects of the law. (3) The index is, of course, not as detailed or
complete as it should be. The table of cases is infuriating. Its refer-
ences are not to pages, but to Parts, Chapters and Sections; Sections
are newly numbered in each of 45 Chapters, and Chapters are newly
numbered in each of three Parts, and only page designations appear
in the margins. This means that the seeker after wisdom on a parti-
cular case must look from the case table to the table of contents,
then to the first page of the section cited, and, finally, through the
text and notes of the entire section. The frequent cross references
require the same irritating process.
Alan R. Bromberg*
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law;
attorney, Carrington, Gowan, Johnson, Bromberg and Leeds, Dallas, Texas.
22 This is implicit in the authors' ingenious but labored effort to classify the three taxes
as mutually inclusive or exclusive in respect of incomplete transfers; see pp. 688-89,
724-35.
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MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY LAW, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
SCHOOL OF LAW COMPARATIVE LAW SERIES, VOLUME 2. W.
FRIEDMANN, ED. Toronto, Ontario: The Carswell Company,
Limited, 1955. Pp. v, 472. $8.50.
COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW.
JAN P. CHARMATZ AND HARRIET S. DAGGETT, ED. Baton Rouge,
Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1955. Pp. iv, 190.
$6.00.
CASES ON COMMUNITY PROPERTY, 4TH ED. BY WILLIAM E.
BURBY. St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1955. Pp. xviii,
342. $8.00.
TEXAS CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF MARITAL
RIGHTS. BY WILLIAM 0. HuIE. St. Paul, Minnesota: West Pub-
lishing Co., 1955. Pp. xxi, 781. $12.00.
Any student or practitioner in the field of matrimonial property
law, as well as any legislator who may be called on to change the
prevailing rules in that field, should find the work of Professor Fried-
mann and his contributors immensely valuable. It is a collection of
eleven essays on the matrimonial property systems of (i) France,
Louisiana, New Mexico and the southwestern United States, Quebec,
South Africa and the Soviet Union, exemplifying various sorts of
community property regimes,' (ii) England, New York and the
common law provinces of Canada, as examples of the modern common
law separate property systems, and (iii) Germany (a synthesis of the
Reform Bill of 1953 not yet enacted)' and Sweden, as representatives
of intermediate systems. To all this is appended a comparative analysis
by the editor. Some of the essays on the law of particular jurisdictions
are themselves comparative studies in part and some give space to
discussion of suggested reforms; the rest are purely summaries. But
all are very competently done.
Certain reforms are discussed with respect to the laws of Louisiana,
New Mexico, France and Germany. Those of the German Reform
Bill, which would take Germany out of the community property
orbit, are criticized in turn by the editor.' The French have been less
enamoured of changes which, though proposed in the name of the
equality of the sexes, are in some degree contrary to the principle of
'The Texas reader will be a little disappointed that there is no essay on the law of
one of the Hispanic-American states.
'See Mosheim. The Legal Effect of Equal Marital Rights for Women in Germany,
2 INT'L & Comap. L. Q. 430 (1953); N. Y. Times, April 1, 1953, p. 36, col. 6;
Dec. 13, 1953, p. 11, col. 1; and Dec. 19, 1953, p. 2, col. 6.
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unity of the family. The editor's view is that a system on the lines
of Texas matrimonial property law-community of acquests with
certain property subject to individual control of the spouses-is
ideal from the point of view of "equality between the spouses" and
"the partnership idea . . . of marriage." Professor Kahn-Freund
sensibly points out that the doctrine of equality of the sexes does
not necessarily demand separation of property.
The ineptitude of the common law in dealing with the law of
matrimonial property is in part explained, as Professor Kahn-Freund
says, by the fact that English legal language has never had an
equivalent for the French regime matrimonial or the German Gueter-
stand and therefore no notion of this as a separate concept of rules
and institutions. The extremes of separation of property and equality
of the spouses attained in New York would unsettle any community
property lawyer. Indeed a lawyer of the Soviet Union, where com-
munity concepts have become more pronounced in recent years, might
find them slightly revolutionary. But, as Professor Tucker Dean
points out, New Yorkers are generally quite satisfied with their sys-
tem of pronounced equality of the spouses, though in the Orwellian
sense the wife may at times be "more equal" than the husband. On
the other hand, those common lawyers who are willing to acknowledge
the juridical nature of the community property systems-at least as
a basis for argument-would be horrified to learn that in New
Mexico and Nevada a married woman has no power of testamen-
tary disposition of a share of the general community property,"
though those common lawyers have perhaps forgotten that at com-
mon law a married woman might make a will only with her husband's
consent, which was subject to revocation after her death. But having
lived in both community and separate property jurisdictions, the
writer feels that a lawyer's belief-indeed addiction-to either system
is a matter of environment and training, a cultural habit of mind.
It is all but impossible to explain community property doctrine to a
confirmed common lawyer, for one is immediately met by a mental
block that is often expressed, "But the wife doesn't deserve any in-
terest in the property. It isn't hers." At that point one might as
well leave off trying to make a convincing argument to the con-
3 For a comparison of the French, Texas and German (at least prior to April 1,
1953) law, see Purcell, A Comparison of the Community Property Systems of France,
Germany, and Texas, 34 TEXAS L. REV. 1065 (1956).
'The still incredulous will please see N. M. STAT. ANN. 5 29-1-8 (1953);
NEV. CoMp. LAWS S 3395.01 (Supp. 1941).
'See Married Women's Property Act, 1882, 45 & 46 VICT. c. 75, 5 17; and Bendall
v. McWhirter, [1952] 2 Q.B. 466, per Denning, L. J.
19 57]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
trary. It is interesting to note in this context that in England
modern legislation has had the effect in all except the largest estates
of giving a community-property treatment of the estate in behalf
of the surviving spouse in case of dissolution of the marriage by death,
and judicial interpretation has had the same effect in other instances
Two striking instances of Texas' being out-of-step with both the
common law and community property jurisdictions must be noted.
Texas is alone among American community property states in failing
to grant permanent alimony.' This state of the law is sometime
popularly explained as an aspect of community property doctrine,
but the true explanation would seem to be that the Texas statute em-
powers the divorce court to order "a division of the estate of the
parties in such a way as the court shall deem just and right"' and the
fact that the Texas law alludes to alimony only in the sense of ali-
mony pendente lite.' Secondly, among all community property juris-
dictions, Texas alone affords no means of choosing a matrimonial
property regime other than the single regime prescribed by the state's
Constitution.! As M. Ancel points out, much of the flexibility of the
French system is accomplished by the availability of alternative
regimes which may be instituted by antenuptial agreement. It is of
further interest to Texans that Professor Hazzard notes in his analysis
of the law of Soviet Russia that "lottery winnings on a state bond
owned by one of the spouses belong to the spouse in whose name the
bond is registered" although such bonds are usually purchased from
wages that are community property. This view may be some con-
solation to those who have criticized the contrary conclusion in Dixon
v. Sanderson." Professor Hazzard also observes that the matrimonial
' The law of Delaware is, however, omewhat similar to the law of Texas. DEL. CODE
ANN. 13 § 1531. Only two other American states fail to award permanent alimony
to the wife; they are North Carolina and Pennsylvania. See Feldman v. Feldman, 23
N.C. 731, 73 S.E.2d 865 (1953), and Commonwealth v. Scholl, 156 Pa. Super. 136,
39 A.2d 719 (1944), where it was pointed out that permanent alimony is awarded
only to an insane wife in Pennsylvania.
'TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4638 (1951). See Pape v. Pape, 35 S.W. 479
(Tex. Civ. App. 1896) error dism. Article 4638 is derived from Section 4 of the Act
of January 6, 1841. 2 GAMMEL'S LAWS OF TEXAS 485. Previously, permanent alimony
was apparently available under Section 2 of the Act of December 18, 1837. 1
GAMMEL'S LAWS OF TEXAS 1437; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 120 Tex. 491, 40
S.W.2d 47 (1931).
5
TEx. REV. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 4637 (1951).
'In spite of Articles 4610-4612, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. (1951); Gorman v. Gause,
56 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933). See also McFadden v. McFadden, 213 S.W.2d
71 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) mand. overr.; Hartman v. Hartman, 217 S.W.2d 872 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1949) error ref. n.r.e.
1072 Tex. 359, 10 S.W. 535 (1888). One is also reminded of the United States Supreme
Court's treatment of the proceeds of a National Service Life Insurance policy, the pre-
miums of which were paid out of community funds. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655
[Vol. I11
property law of the Soviet Union is now being developed along com-
mon law lines, that is, by judicial interpretation and expansion.
In the Charmatz and Daggett book, where the law of a smaller
geographical area is under consideration (the community property
law of the United States), the standard of the product is regrettably
very much lower. Whereas there is also an analysis of proposals for
French law reform, there is no comment whatever on the law of
Puerto Rico. The title is somewhat misleading. None of the essays can
be called a "comparative study""; comparison is left to the reader.
While some of these essays give good comprehensive summaries of
the law of a particular jurisdiction,"' others consider very specialized
topics of the law of the state. Professor Charmatz in his Foreword
excuses this failing by pointing out that general monographs are
elsewhere available. But it would have been most helpful to have had
a collection of general summaries in one volume. All of the essays in
the Charmatz and Daggett book first appeared in the Louisiana Law
Review. It is regretted that the editorial care of that review was
not exercised in the preparation of this volume. There are, for ex-
ample, four misspelled words on the upper half of page 145 and two
in an even smaller area on page 143. The index is also most inadequate,
but even so a practitioner in the field will find this volume useful.
Professor Burby's collection of cases is understandably directed
toward the law of California and the surrounding community prop-
erty states that to a great extent follow her lead. Texas cases are not
numerous. Professor Huie's collection of cases and statutes (of which
there is, most regrettably, no table) is clearly designed for Texas
users only. Though confined principally to Texas law, the scope of
Professor Huie's work is larger, including marriage, divorce and
homestead law. It is unfortunate, it is submitted, that more materials
concerning custody and support were not included. The volume also
lacks mention of the impact of the various forms of social security
on the law of matrimonial property. Each volume contains commen-
taries by its editor which are very useful. The indices of both case-
(1950). The Court held that the proceeds were payable wholly to the husband's named
beneficiary in excluding a claim to one-half of the proceeds by the wife. One suspects
that the majority opinion was largely aimed at administrative convenience of the Vet-
erans' Administration.
" With the possible exception of Dean Lyon's essay on the law of Arizona. In his study
of the rights of creditors against property of the spouses in Idaho, Professor Brocklebank
offers some most informative tables of liability. Tables comparing the law of the various
states would have been very interesting indeed.
" Notably Professor Huie's excellent essay on the Texas Law, which in many respects
brings up to date his essay on the same subject in 13 VERNON's AN. TEX. CIv. STATS. V11
(1951) which is also available as a separate publication, Hum, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY
LAW OF TEXAs. Kansas City, Missouri: Vernon Law Book Co., 1951. $.50.
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books could be usefully expanded; the less said about the double
columns of text and paucity of margins, the better. In the heading of
each case the publisher has the disconcerting practice of putting its
citation before the official one. This practice is not followed in the
commentaries, however. Professor Burby's book is in its fourth edition
and is well arranged. Though this is the first edition of Professor
Huie's book in this form, it is the product of long preparation and
use in mimeographed form. The result is a masterpiece, which has
been given the acid test of successful classroom use. Both books
would be a useful addition to the library of a lawyer practicing in the
field of matrimonial property. S.M.U. students have paid Professor
Huie's book the highest compliment within their power to bestow.
An unusually small percentage of the books were sold back to the
college bookstores at the end of the term during which the book was
used.
Joseph W. McKnight*
* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
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